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Summary
In relation to the construction of a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel in Olkiluoto, 
Posiva Oy runs a multidisciplinary monitoring programme targeted at studying the 
environmental impact of the project, improving the understanding of the natural properties 
of the site, verifying favourable conditions for long-term safety, and developing methods 
for monitoring the performance of engineered barriers. The aim of this report is to assess 
the usability of the data produced by the monitoring programme for the implementation 
of nuclear safeguards, which in the case of a disposal facility under construction primarily 
involves detecting the excavation of any undeclared underground rooms or surface 
construction.
Among the measurements included in the programme, microseismic monitoring is 
currently the only one whose results, located seismic events in Olkiluoto and surroundings 
are already used in implementing national safeguards. An examination of the monitoring 
programme leads to the conclusion that, in addition to microseismic monitoring, automatic 
hydraulic head measurements in deep drillholes and land use monitoring produce relevant 
data for safeguards.
Hydraulic head (in other words, groundwater pressure) is monitored in several drillholes 
that penetrate the rock volume where the disposal facility is going to be excavated. The 
monitored drillholes are divided into sections, so that head can be measured separately at 
different depths. The monitored sections are often situated in hydrogeological zones, where 
a fault in the crystalline bedrock allows groundwater to flow significantly more freely than 
elsewhere. Experience has shown that, in some of these zones, a groundwater leak into a 
new tunnel or drillhole at one point gives rise to a significant decrease of hydraulic head at 
such a large distance that it can be readily detected in several monitoring sections.
Monitoring of land use is based on aerial photographs taken every other year and 
maintaining a land use record. These sources are used to regularly update a land use grid 
covering the whole of Olkiluoto. The aerial photographs and land use grid can supplement 
other imagery used to verify the declaration of surface constructions.
The inclusion of the results of hydraulic head and land use monitoring in the input for the 
implementation of safeguards could apparently be achieved by examining material that 
Posiva already delivers for other purposes. The estimated work load would be of the order 
of a week per year for hydraulic head monitoring and a few days per year for land use 
monitoring.
PENTTI Elias, HEIKKINEN Eero (Pöyry Finland Oy). Usability of Olkiluoto Monitoring Programme for 
implementing nuclear safeguards. STUK-TR 28. Helsinki 2017. 31 pp.
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Tiivistelmä
Posiva Oy ylläpitää käytetyn ydinpolttoaineen loppusijoituslaitoksen rakentamisen 
aikana monialaista monitorointiohjelmaa, jonka tavoitteina on seurata hankkeen 
ympäristövaikutuksia, hankkia lisää tietoa Olkiluodon laitospaikan luonnollisista 
ominaisuuksista, varmistua pitkäaikaisturvallisuuden kannalta otollisten olosuhteiden 
säilymisestä ja kehittää menetelmiä laitoksen teknisten vapautumisesteiden toimin-
nan seurantaan. Tässä raportissa arvioidaan monitorointiohjelman tuottamien 
tulosten käyttökelpoisuutta ydinmateriaalivalvonnassa, joka rakenteilla olevan 
loppusijoituslaitoksen tapauksessa merkitsee ensisijaisesti ilmoittamattomien 
maanalaisten tai maanpäällisen tilojen rakentamisen havaitsemista.
Mikroseisminen monitorointi tuottaa tulkintoja Olkiluodon ympäristöön 
paikannetuista seismisistä tapahtumista. Tämä on raporttia kirjoitettaessa ainoa 
ohjelmaan kuuluva monitorointimenetelmä, jonka tuloksia jo käytetään kansallisessa 
ydinmateriaalivalvonnassa. Monitorointiohjelman tarkastelun johtopäätöksenä on, 
että mikroseismisen monitoroinnin lisäksi hydraulisen painekorkeuden automaattinen 
seuranta syvissä kairarei’issä ja maankäytön monitorointi tuottavat tuloksia, jotka ovat 
käyttökelpoisia  ydinmateriaalivalvonnan kannalta.
Hydraulista painekorkeutta (eli kalliopohjaveden painetta) monitoroidaan useissa 
kairarei’issä, jotka lävistävät kalliotilavuutta, johon loppusijoitustilat aiotaan 
louhia. Monitoroitavat reiät on jaettu hydraulisesti eristetyiksi tulppaväleiksi, jotta 
painekorkeutta voidaan mitata samanaikaisesti ja riippumattomasti eri syvyyksiltä. 
Monitoroitavat tulppavälit sijaitsevat usein hydrogeologisissa vyöhykkeissä, joissa kiteisen 
peruskallion rakoilu sallii pohjaveden virtaavan selvästi vapaammin kuin muualla. 
Kokemus on osoittanut, että joissakin vyöhykkeissä pistemäinen pohjaveden vuoto uuteen 
tunneliin tai reikään aiheuttaa merkittävän painekorkeuden aleneman niin kaukana, että 
se on helposti havaittavissa useissa monitoroiduissa tulppaväleissä.
Maankäytön monitorointi perustuu ilmakuviin, joita otetaan joka toinen vuosi, ja 
maankäyttörekisterin ylläpitoon. Näiden lähteiden perusteella Posiva päivittää 
säännöllisesti koko Olkiluodon kattavan maankäyttöruudukon. Sekä ilmakuvat että 
maankäyttöruudukko ovat sopivia täydentämään muuta kuvamateriaalia, jota käytetään 
laitosalueen rakennuksista tehdyn vuosi-ilmoituksen todentamiseen.
Painekorkeuden ja maankäytön monitorointitulokset saadaan tarvittaessa 
ydinmateriaalivalvonnan käyttöön dokumenteista, jotka Posiva toimittaa säännöllisesti 
Säteilyturvakeskukselle muita tarkoituksia varten. Arvioitu vuotuinen työmäärä olisi 
noin viikko hydraulisen painekorkeuden monitoroinnin ja muutamia päiviä maankäytön 
monitorointia osalta.
PENTTI Elias, HEIKKINEN Eero (Pöyry Finland Oy). Olkiluodon monitorointiohjelman käytettävyys 
ydinmateriaalivalvonnassa. STUK-TR 28. Helsinki 2017. 31 pp.
Avainsanat: ydinmateriaalivalvonta, käytetty ydinpolttoaine, loppusijoitus, monitorointi, seismiikka, 
hydrogeologia
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1 Introduction
It has been decided that spent nuclear fuel produced 
in the currently operational nuclear power plants in 
Finland will be disposed of in a geological repository 
in Olkiluoto, an island on the south-western coast 
of Finland and also the location of a nuclear power 
plant – see map in Figure 1. Posiva Oy, a company 
founded and jointly owned by two operators of 
nuclear power plants, Teollisuuden Voima Oyj and 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy, is responsible for the 
construction of the disposal facility and projects to 
begin the deposition in the early 2020s.
The construction of the actual repository was 
preceded by the excavation of an underground 
rock characterisation facility, called the ONKALO, 
which will eventually become the access route to the 
deposition galleries. Figure 2 shows the location of 
the ONKALO in Olkiluoto and a 3D view of it at the 
end of 2016. It consists of an access ramp, shafts for 
ventilation and hoists, and various niches, tunnels 
and halls for technical and research purposes, but 
no actual disposal galleries yet. The disposal facility 
will also include buildings at ground level near the 
entrance to the ONKALO, such as an encapsulation 
plant and ventilation and hoist buildings, some 
of which are already complete and some under 
construction.
The final disposal project involves an extensive 
research programme, which started with geological 
site characterisation at several candidate sites be-
fore the selection of Olkiluoto, and has progressively 
widened to include, for example, the development 
of disposal and excavation techniques, studies of 
surface ecology (summarised in Posiva 2013), and 
long-term experiments on groundwater chemistry 
Figure 1. The location of Olkiluoto.
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(Käpyaho et al. 2012). On the basis of the Nuclear 
Energy Act (Council of State 1987), STUK has is-
sued Regulatory Guides that determine the legal 
requirements for the nuclear safety of the disposal 
facility and also to the related research. Regulatory 
Guide YVL D.5: Disposal of Nuclear Waste (STUK 
2013b), issued in 2013, states in paragraph 506:
During the construction and operation of the dis-
posal facility, a research, testing and monitoring 
programme shall be executed to ensure that the 
Figure 2. Above: map of Olkiluoto with the horizontal projection of the ONKALO shown in red. Grid size 1 km. 
Below: 3D illustration of the ONKALO at the end of 2016 (Haapalehto et al. 2017). The deepest parts are about 460 
m below ground, and the length of the spiralling access ramp is about 5 km. View from the south.
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site and the rock to be excavated are suitable for 
disposal and to collect supplementary informa-
tion the safety-relevant characteristics of the host 
rock and the performance of the barriers.
To fulfil this requirement, Posiva runs a multi-
disciplinary Olkiluoto Monitoring Programme, 
whose aims include studying the impact of the 
repository project on the environment, improving 
the understanding of the conditions at the site, and 
supporting the analysis of the long-term safety of 
the repository. At present, monitoring is based on a 
programme presented by Posiva (2012), intended to 
cover the period of the construction of the repository 
before operation. Preparation of an updated moni-
toring programme for the operational phase is in 
process.
This report discusses the usability of Posiva’s 
monitoring programme for implementing nuclear 
safeguards at the Olkiluoto site – during the cur-
rent construction phase and, as regards detecting 
undeclared excavation, also during the operational 
phase. Nuclear safeguards are based on interna-
tional treaties, agreements and protocols (IAEA 
1970, 1972, 1997) that oblige Finland as a state to 
ensure for its part that the use of nuclear energy 
and nuclear materials remains strictly limited to 
peaceful purposes without the risk of proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. European Commission Regula-
tion (Euratom) No 302/2005 (EC 2005) and STUK 
Regulatory Guide YVL D.1: Regulatory Control of 
Nuclear Safeguards (STUK 2013a) give the frame-
work for Posiva’s reporting to the international 
inspectorates. This includes the design information 
including maps in area layout in BTC (Basic Techni-
cal Characteristics) and those in the site declaration 
according to the Additional Protocol. In Finland, 
the implementation of nuclear safeguards at state 
level is the responsibility of the Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), and as regards 
the disposal facility in Olkiluoto, of Posiva Oy as 
the construction licence holder. Section 3.7 of Guide 
YVL D.1: Regulatory Control of Nuclear Safeguards 
(STUK 2013a), entitled “Specific requirements 
related to the disposal of spent nuclear fuel”, states 
in paragraph 355 that:
The operator shall also ensure that no unde-
clared activities of nuclear safeguards relevance 
take place in the disposal area (area delimited in 
the decision-in-principle).
The next paragraph reads:
The operator shall demonstrate during the 
construction of the nuclear waste facility and 
the associated underground facilities that the 
facility is being constructed in compliance with 
the notifications filed.
And paragraph 359:
The operator shall design the nuclear waste 
facility and its operations in such a way that the 
continuity of control data after the verification 
of the fuel items can be assured every step of the 
way. If the continuity is lost, it shall be possible 
to re-verify the fuel items.
Therefore, from the point of view of the final deposi-
tion of spent nuclear fuel in the geological repository 
in Olkiluoto, nuclear safeguards most importantly 
concern the verification of two issues: first, that the 
construction of underground facilities corresponds 
to the reported and licenced design, and second, that 
full accountability for all nuclear material is main-
tained in the process of transport, encapsulation 
and final deposition of spent nuclear fuel (or any 
other nuclear material). Of these two safeguards 
issues, the monitoring programme mainly contrib-
utes to the first one, because the surveillance of the 
operation of the facility is not within its scope.
Posiva has had a safeguards programme since 
the early stages of the excavation of the ONKALO. 
Under that programme, detected microseismic 
events in Olkiluoto have been regularly reported 
to STUK as the only contribution of the monitoring 
programme to safeguards implementation.
10
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2 Monitoring programme
Olkiluoto Monitoring Programme (in Finnish: Olki-
luodon monitorointiohjelma, OMO) has formally 
existed since 2004 (Posiva 2003), the year when 
Posiva started the excavation of the ONKALO. 
However, in some of the subjects now included in 
the monitoring programme, repeated long-term 
measurements have been carried out for several 
years before launching the actual programme.
The present Monitoring Programme (Posiva 
2012) defines monitoring as “Continuous or periodic 
observations and measurements of engineering, 
environmental or radiological parameters, to help 
evaluate the behaviour of components of the 
repository system, or the impacts of the reposi-
tory and its operation on the environment, and to 
help in making decisions on the implementation 
of successive phases of the disposal concept.” In 
comparison with otherwise similar EC and IAEA 
definitions (EC 2004 and IAEA 2001), the definition 
adopted by Posiva excludes issues like observing 
the societal impact of and public attitudes towards 
the project, and focuses solely on technical and 
scientific measurements motivated by long-term 
safety and environmental impact. Moreover, the 
programme does not intend to cover monitoring 
related to operational and occupational safety, 
technical maintenance and ageing management, or 
nuclear safeguards, but states that these issues are 
covered by other programmes and guides of Posiva.
In 2016, Posiva made some adjustments to the 
Monitoring Programme on the basis of experience 
gathered and changes in the needs for research. 
Its duration was extended to include the years 
2017–2019. The next update of the programme will 
thus take place in 2019 at the latest and, after that, 
a monitoring programme for the operational phase 
of the repository will be compiled and released be-
fore submitting the application for the operational 
licence for the disposal facility. The adjustments 
were published in the form of memos, separately for 
each discipline (document numbers POS-023621–
POS-023626).
Olkiluoto Monitoring Programme is organised 
into five sub-programmes or disciplines:
•	 rock	mechanics
•	 hydrology	and	hydrogeology
•	 hydrogeochemistry
•	 surface	environment
•	 engineered	barrier	system	(EBS).
In the 2012 programme, there also was a separate 
discipline for foreign materials, but in the update 
and reorganisation of 2016, the subject was sepa-
rated from the Monitoring Programme.
A summary of results is published annually as a 
Posiva Working Report for each discipline, available 
in digital format at www.posiva.fi/en/databank/
workreports. For most recent published results, see 
Haapalehto et al. (2017) for rock mechanics, Vait-
tinen et al. (2016) for hydrology and hydrogeology, 
Lamminmäki et al. (2017) for hydrogeochemistry, 
Pere et al. (2017) for surface environment, and 
Sacklén (2016) for foreign materials. In contrast to 
the other monitoring disciplines, EBS monitoring 
is still at the stage of research and development, so 
annual reports of its results are not yet compiled.
2.1 Rock mechanics monitoring
Rock mechanics monitoring concentrates on the 
assessment of tectonic movements in Olkiluoto 
and the surrounding area, and the stability of the 
bedrock. Table 1 presents the rock mechanics moni-
toring programme according to the update of 2016 
(POS-023623) and comments on the relevance of the 
monitoring measurements to safeguards.
Microseismic monitoring aims at detecting seis-
mic events in the “ONKALO block”, a 2 km × 2 km 
× 2 km cube surrounding the ONKALO, and in a 
STUK-TR 28
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wider semi-regional area within a radius of about 
10 km. The main purpose of microseismic monitor-
ing is to improve understanding of the structure, 
behaviour and long-term stability of the bedrock. At 
the beginning of 2017, Posiva’s permanent seismic 
network consisted of 17 seismic stations, seven of 
which were at ground level inside the ONKALO 
block and four further away, one in a borehole next 
to the ONKALO at a depth of 139 m, and five in the 
ONKALO at depths of 276, 293, 369, 420, and 428 
m. During the excavation of the disposal facility, 
the microseismic network is likely to be expanded, 
probably with new measuring stations in the cen-
tral tunnels.
Seismic events can be located with sufficient 
spatial accuracy to determine whether they result 
from excavation by blasting or other reasons such 
as natural or excavation-induced displacements in 
the bedrock. Therefore, microseismic monitoring is 
currently the part of the Monitoring Programme 
that also produces data for Posiva’s safeguards 
programme. Saari & Malm (2015) show in their 
report that, in addition to blasting, microseismic 
monitoring can also be applied to detect and moni-
tor excavation by tunnel boring. However, because 
of the large amount of data gathered, microseismic 
data is not permanently stored as a continuous time 
series. Instead, the measurement system applies 
automatic triggering based on certain pre-defined 
criteria, and saves only the data from the time of 
detected seismic event for further analysis.
GPS measurements and surface levelling are 
performed to monitor relative crustal movements 
in Olkiluoto and the surrounding region. Meas-
urements of the relative positions of the 18 GPS 
stations mainly provide data on horizontal deforma-
tions, whereas surface levelling between a network 
of 87 fixed measuring points measures vertical 
changes. To exclude systematic error in the GPS 
measurements, the distance between two of the 
GPS stations was previously also monitored by 
electronic distance measurements (EDM), but this 
has been ended as it is redundant.
Rock mechanic monitoring also includes meas-
Table 1. Updated rock mechanics monitoring programme for 2017–19. Modified from Table 2 in POS-023623.
Process Target/method Location Frequency Relevance to safeguards
Seismicity, reactivation 
of bedrock structures
Microseismic 
monitoring
18 automatic stations Continuous Located seismic events 
indicate excavation by 
blasting; data already 
used for safeguards
Tectonic movement of 
bedrock
GPS measurements 17 automatic stations Continuous
none
1 manual station Twice a year
Control marker 
measurements
Carried out as a part of GPS and levelling 
measurements near GPS stations if necessary 
(suspected pillar damage)
none
Isostatic land uplift Precise levelling Levelling loops: ONKALO, 
VLJ (low and intermediate-
level radioactive waste 
repository), Olkiluoto line
Once a year
noneGPS network Once in 2018
Olkiluoto–Lapijoki line Every fourth 
year; not during 
2017–19
Redistribution of rock 
stress
Extensometry Selected locations in the 
ONKALO
Continuous
noneReactivation of bedrock 
structures
Surface extensometry Selected intersections 
of tunnels and bedrock 
structures
Continuous
Thermal evolution Monitoring of 
temperature
Temperature profiles in 
drillholes
During flow and 
geophysical 
loggings
Anomaly in temperature 
profile may indicate open 
space near the drillhole
Tunnel air, (surface) 
extensometers
Continuous none
Spalling Visual monitoring All underground spaces Continuous none
12
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urements of rock displacements and temperatures 
in the ONKALO. Displacements are monitored by 
extensometers installed in boreholes to detect the 
response of the rock mass to the stress redistribu-
tion that results from excavation. Some of the 
measurement locations are in known brittle fault 
zones so that possible displacements in these zones 
could be detected. The Monitoring Programme of 
2012 also mentions monitoring rock creep with 
load cells in rock bolts and rock displacements with 
convergence measurements, but these methods 
have been abandoned as unfeasible.
2.2 Hydrological and 
hydrogeological monitoring
Figure 3 shows the hydrogeological measuring 
points in central Olkiluoto, drawn on an aerial pho-
tograph of the area. One deep drillhole (OL-KR58) 
has been drilled below the sea from a smaller island 
west of Olkiluoto and is shown in the embedded 
pane in the lower left-hand-side corner. The embed-
ded pane in the upper right-hand-side corner shows 
the densely located drillholes and observation tubes 
in an area north of the ONKALO entrance used for 
field studies on groundwater infiltration.
Table 2 presents the monitoring programme 
of hydrology and hydrogeology according to the 
update of 2016 (POS-023622) and comments on 
the relevance of the monitoring measurements to 
safeguards.
Groundwater table is monitored by regular 
measurements of water level in several shallow 
drillholes and groundwater observation tubes. 
The results are used to assess the impact of the 
excavation of the disposal facility and other human 
activities on shallow groundwater and to study its 
natural behaviour.
Groundwater flow in the bedrock is studied by 
drillhole measurements with the Posiva Flow Log 
(PFL) tool. The tool is able to detect groundwater 
flow between a drillhole and a single intersecting 
fracture or a fracture zone. Flow logging with dif-
ferent drillhole pressures yields information on the 
hydraulic conductivity of the rock mass, because 
the transmissivities of the intersecting fractures or 
deformation zones can be calculated from the data. 
Figure 3. Drillholes and other measuring points used for hydrological and hydrogeological monitoring in Olki-
luoto. Deep core-drilled holes are marked with a triangle at the mouth and a black line representing the surface 
projection. The access ramp of the ONKALO is marked by the winding black line in the middle of the image. The 
nuclear power plant, with two reactor units in operation and one under construction, and related facilities, are 
situated in the lighter area west of the ONKALO.
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With the PFL TRANS version of the tool, the rate 
and direction of transverse flow across a drillhole 
can be measured. This method is used to monitor 
flow in a few fractures near the ONKALO where the 
rate is sufficiently large for measurement.
Most of the almost 60 deep characterisation 
Table 2. Updated hydrological and hydrogeological monitoring programme for 2017–19. Modified from Table 1 in 
POS-023622.
Process Target/method Location Frequency Relevance to safeguards
Evolution of 
groundwater 
table
Groundwater level 
measurements
Observation tubes, 
manual Monthly
In principle, a possibility of 
detecting undeclared earthwork 
or tunnelling, but at such a short 
range that it would probably also be 
detected visually by field personnel.
Observation tubes, 
automatic Hourly
Shallow bedrock holes, 
manual Monthly
Sampling rate too low for reliably 
detecting and distinguishing 
underground activities.
Shallow bedrock holes, 
automatic Hourly
Potentially detects tunnel 
excavation if a suitable hydraulic 
connection exists.
Evolution of 
groundwater 
flow
Flow conditions in open 
drillholes
Selected holes
Once a year
Potentially detects tunnel 
excavation if a suitable hydraulic 
connection exists. No systematic 
monitoring of all holes.
Transverse flow in 
drillholes
Selected holes
Once a year
Theoretically detects tunnel 
excavation if a suitable hydraulic 
connection exists. Only a few 
fractures are monitored.
Evolution of 
hydraulic 
properties in the 
bedrock and the 
overburden
Hydraulic conductivity/ 
transmissivity of 
structures
Flow logging of 
drillholes Once a year see previous process
Slug tests in 
groundwater 
observation tubes
Once a year none
Evolution of 
hydraulic head
Hydraulic head 
monitoring
Deep open bedrock 
holes Weekly
Sampling rate too low for reliably 
detecting and distinguishing 
underground activities
Packed-off surface 
drillholes Hourly
Detects tunnel excavation in case 
it causes a change in the flow of 
groundwater from a monitored 
hydrogeological structure. 
Packed-off ONKALO 
drillholes At least hourly
Analysis of pressure 
responses
Hydraulic head data
Inflow into 
tunnels
Total inflow Monthly Undeclared tunnelling or additional 
excavation is highly unlikely to 
affect the inflow into existing, 
declared tunnels to a detectable 
extent.
Inflow at measuring 
weirs
manual weirs Monthly
automatic weirs 4 times / hour
Individual leakage 
points Monthly
Leakages in shafts Monthly
Visual mapping of 
leakages Once a year
Air flow and humidity Daily
Amount of process 
water used Weekly
Influence of 
Korvensuo 
reservoir
Korvensuo water level Weekly
noneHydraulic conductivity 
at the dam seepage 
tubes
Every other year
14
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drillholes in Olkiluoto are packed-off, in other 
words equipped with a set of inflatable packers 
that divide the drillhole into hydraulically isolated 
sections. Hydraulic head is monitored automatically 
in selected packer sections, typically once in an 
hour. In open drillholes, fracture-specific head data 
is obtained from PFL flow logging measurements. 
In addition to the deep drillholes, hydraulic head is 
also monitored in multi-level piezometers, which are 
drillholes about 100 metres deep and divided into 
four monitoring sections with permanent cement 
plugs. Hydraulic head data together with results 
on groundwater flow and hydraulic conductivity are 
used in the assessment of the effect of the disposal 
facility, hydrogeological modelling of Olkiluoto, and 
interpretation of hydrogeochemical observations. 
Flow logging with the PFL tool also produces data 
on hydraulic head in the deep drillhole studied. 
That data has a better spatial resolution than the 
continuous monitoring of a multi-packered drillhole, 
but as only a fraction of holes are logged each year, 
the acquired time series are so sparse that they do 
not usually allow observing variation in time.
Inflow into tunnels and the water balance of the 
ONKALO in monitored with automatic and manual 
measuring weirs along the ONKALO access tunnel, 
inflow measurements in the shafts, visual mapping 
of tunnel walls, flow and humidity measurements of 
the ventilation air of the ONKALO, and measure-
ment of the usage of process water.
Influence of Korvensuo reservoir is a special issue 
because of the vicinity of this artificial volume of 
surface water near the ONKALO. Water level in the 
reservoir and its effects on groundwater chemistry 
are monitored.
Monitoring of surface hydrology gathers data 
on, among other things, the variation of sea level, 
surface water runoff, precipitation, snow depth 
and water content, ground frost and infiltration of 
surface water into the groundwater system. These 
issues partly overlap with the monitoring of surface 
environment.
According to the programme update memo of 
2016, hydrological monitoring has remained essen-
tially unchanged throughout the construction of the 
ONKALO, and no significant changes are expected 
to occur in the operational phase of the disposal 
facility either. Drillhole measurements with the 
Hydraulic Testing Unit (HTU) were, however, dis-
continued. One possible new issue in the discipline 
is the research and development of methods and 
effects of permanently sealing the deep drillholes 
drilled from ground surface.
2.3 Hydrogeochemical monitoring
Table 3 presents the updated hydrogeochemical 
monitoring programme (POS-023621). It is based 
on the analysis of water samples, either taken to 
the laboratory from various locations in Olkiluoto 
or examined in situ. Understanding the composition 
of groundwater and processes affecting it is crucial 
for the long-term safety of the disposal project as it 
has a great influence on the performance of the en-
gineered barriers (copper canister, bentonite buffer, 
and tunnel backfill) and on the migration and reten-
tion of radionuclides both in the geosphere and in 
the biosphere. Therefore, the target properties set 
for the conditions in the disposal tunnels and holes 
include a number of requirements for groundwa-
ter chemistry, and systematic hydrogeochemical 
monitoring is expected to continue throughout the 
construction and operation of the facility. Changes 
in groundwater chemistry, especially close to the 
surface, are also monitored to detect any envi-
ronmental effects of the project (or other human 
activity) in Olkiluoto.
2.4 Monitoring of the surface 
environment
The two main reasons for the monitoring of the 
surface environment in Olkiluoto are to observe 
the environmental impact of the repository project 
and to acquire input data for biosphere modelling 
used in the assessment of the long-term safety of 
final disposal. In the 2016 update of the Monitoring 
Programme (POS-023624), the studies motivated by 
the biosphere modelling were significantly reduced, 
as no additional input is required in the present 
stage of preparing the next Safety Case (aiming at 
the application of the nuclear operational licence 
in 2020). Therefore, the present monitoring pro-
gramme for surface environment mainly focuses 
on the conventional (non-nuclear) environmental 
effects of the disposal project that resemble those 
of a mine or an industrial construction. Monitoring 
targets include noise, water in the ditches that 
flow into the sea from the ONKALO and from the 
rock piling area, and yield and quality of household 
water in drilled wells in eastern Olkiluoto. Some 
biological and ecological issues that were earlier 
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studied to support the biosphere modelling now 
belong to a biodiversity study, planned to be done 
every 10 years.
The determination of a baseline for monitoring 
radioactive releases previously belonged to the sur-
face environment monitoring programme, but has 
now been reorganised into a separate project out-
side the Monitoring Programme. In the operational 
phase of the disposal facility, monitoring of radioac-
tive substances in its surroundings could also serve 
safeguards control by, for example, detecting the 
handling of nuclear materials on the surface some-
where else than inside the encapsulation plant. The 
subject of environmental monitoring that also has 
some relevance for safeguards, changes in land use, 
is based on aerial photographs taken every other 
year, keeping record of changes in infrastructure 
and other land use, and maintaining a land use grid 
(division of Olkiluoto into 50 m × 50 m squares). The 
latest reported update of the land use grid describes 
the situation in 2013 (Pere et al. 2015).
2.5 Monitoring of the engineered 
barrier system
In the KBS-3H concept of final deposition that 
Posiva’s plans are based on, the engineered bar-
rier system (EBS) includes four components: 1) 
the copper canister into which the spent fuel in 
Table 3. Updated hydrogeochemical monitoring programme for 2017–19. Modified from Table 1 in POS-023621.
Process Target/method Location Frequency Relevance to safeguards
Evolution of 
groundwater 
properties and 
salinity distribution 
in shallow 
groundwater
Groundwater 
sampling and 
chemical analysis
Groundwater 
observation tubes 
and shallow surface 
drillholes
2–3 sampling 
campaigns per year
In principle, a possibility 
of detecting undeclared 
earthwork or construction on 
ground surface, but at such 
a short range that it would 
probably also be detected 
visually by field personnel. 
Monitoring of radioactivity not 
part of the programme.
Evolution of 
groundwater 
properties 
and salinity 
distribution in deep 
groundwater
Groundwater 
sampling and 
chemical analysis
Deep surface 
drillholes, drillholes in 
the ONKALO
According to an 
annual plan
Undeclared tunnelling or 
additional excavation is highly 
unlikely to affect groundwater 
chemistry to a detectable 
extent.
On-line measurement 
of pH, EC, O2, Eh, T
Deep surface 
drillholes, drillholes in 
the ONKALO
During groundwater 
sampling or 
continuously
Microbe and gas 
sampling
Deep surface 
drillholes, drillholes in 
the ONKALO
According to an 
annual plan
Influence of 
Korvensuo reservoir
Stable isotope 
samples (δ²H and 
δ18O)
Shallow and deep 
surface drillholes, 
drillholes in the 
ONKALO
According to an 
annual plan none
Influence of foreign 
materials
Sampling and 
analysis of defined 
parameters
Drillholes in the 
ONKALO
According to an 
annual plan
Foreign materials from 
undeclared tunnelling or 
additional excavation are 
highly unlikely to affect 
groundwater chemistry to a 
detectable extent.
Leaking structures in 
the ONKALO
Once or twice a year
Inflow into the 
ONKALO
Automatic 
observations
Measuring weirs Continuous Potentially detects undeclared 
excavation in the ONKALO 
itself on the basis of increased 
flow of technical water in the 
access ramp.
Chemical analyses of 
samples
Measuring weirs Once a year Sampling rate too low 
for reliably detecting and 
distinguishing underground 
activities.
Leaking structures in 
the ONKALO
Once or twice a year
16
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encapsulated before deposition, 2) a bentonite buffer 
that surrounds the canister in the deposition hole, 
3) deposition tunnel backfill, and 4) auxiliary com-
ponents such as various plugs and seals for closing 
tunnels and holes and backfill of other excavated 
spaces besides deposition tunnels.
Monitoring of the EBS is still in the development 
stage rather than a subject of regular monitoring. 
The Monitoring Programme of 2012 presented a 
description of preliminary ideas and the ongoing 
tests of possible techniques. Posiva plans to develop 
Table 4. Updated monitoring programme of the surface environment for 2017–19. Modified from Table 2 in POS-
023624.
Motivation Subject Target/method Frequency Relevance to safeguards
Input data for 
modelling, aquatic 
ecosystems 
Sea water quality Hydrogeochemical 
characterisation
A campaign in 2017
noneSea water quality Three samples a year
Background data on 
water quality
Provided by TVO
River discharge 
and water quality
Water quality 
monitoring
Provided by TVO
none
River discharge, 
by environmental 
authorities
Continuous
Background data Provided by TVO
Bottom fauna 
background data
Provided by TVO
Test and account 
fishing, interviews
Provided by TVO
Interaction 
between surface 
environment and 
groundwater in 
bedrock
Land use Aerial photographs Every other year Can supplement present 
satellite imaging
Records of changes in 
infrastructure and other 
land use
Continuous Can supplement present 
accounting of surface facilities 
(if not already used)
Update of land use grid in 2018 Can supplement present 
accounting of surface facilities 
(if not already used)
Records of forest and 
aquatic management
Continuous none
Surface 
hydrology and 
meteorology
Surface water 
discharge (automatic 
weirs)
Continuous
none
Weather observations Continuous
none
Precipitation Continuous
Snow cover Continuous during 
winter
Ground frost Continuous during 
winter
the first version of an EBS monitoring programme 
before submitting the operational licence applica-
tion.
2.6 Monitoring of foreign materials
Before 2016, the Monitoring Programme included 
a discipline for monitoring foreign materials. Its 
purpose was to register all materials used in the 
construction of the ONKALO, estimate the amounts 
of materials that have ended up in the ONKALO un-
intentionally, maintain Posiva’s Material Handbook 
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Motivation Subject Target/method Frequency Relevance to safeguards
Environmental 
impact of the final 
disposal project
Noise Twice a year Sampling rate too low 
for reliably detecting and 
distinguishing undeclared 
activities, unless on such a 
remarkable scale that it would 
also be detected visually by field 
personnel.
Effluent water On-line measurements 
of surface runoff
Continuous In principle, a possibility of 
detecting undeclared earthwork 
or construction on ground 
surface, but the scale of the 
activity would need be so 
large that it would probably 
also be detected visually by 
field personnel. Monitoring of 
radioactivity not part of the 
programme.
Quality of drainage 
water (in weirs)
Three samples per 
year
Sampling rate too low 
for reliably detecting and 
distinguishing undeclared 
activities.
ONKALO outlet waters 
(in ditch)
Continuous 
monitoring of basic 
parameters + four 
samples per year for 
analysis
In principle, a possibility 
of detecting undeclared 
excavation in the ONKALO, but 
the scale of the activity would 
need to be so large that it would 
probably also be detected 
visually by field personnel. 
Monitoring of radioactivity not 
part of the programme.
ONKALO process water 
(in sedimentation pool)
Continuous 
monitoring of basic 
parameters + four 
samples per year for 
analysis
Leaching from rock 
spoil
Three samples per 
year for analysis
In principle, a possibility 
of detecting undeclared 
excavation, if the rock spoil 
would end up in the monitored 
piling area.
Impact on natural 
resources
Game statistics Once a year
noneFishing conditions Provided by TVO
Household water 
quality in drilled wells
One sample per year
that defines the materials approved for use in the 
ONKALO, and produce calculations of the amounts 
of different kinds of foreign materials that are 
expected to remain underground as a result of the 
construction of the repository. These activities are 
no longer considered a part of the Monitoring Pro-
gramme. The effect of the use of foreign materials 
is studied within hydrogeochemical monitoring by 
taking water samples from fractures and structures 
in the ONKALO, and within the monitoring of the 
surface environment by sampling the process water 
pumped out of the ONKALO into the sedimentation 
pool and outlet ditch on the surface.
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3 Potential of monitoring in 
safeguards implementation
3.1 Rock mechanics
Microseismic monitoring is currently the only part 
of the monitoring programme whose results Posiva 
submits for safeguard purposes. Each observed 
seismic event is analysed to determine the location 
of its source. Figure 4 presents the located seismic 
events in 2010 within the seismic “ONKALO block”. 
Most of the events were blasts related to the excava-
tion of the lowest straight section of the ONKALO 
access ramp; the marks are coloured on the basis of 
time, so that the progress of excavation is clearly 
visible. There were also detected seismic events on 
or near the ground surface above the ONKALO that 
could be associated with construction of pipelines 
and buildings. Experience from the time of the ex-
cavation of ONKALO has proven that microseismic 
monitoring is able to detect tunnelling by blasting 
reliably and accurately in Olkiluoto. Sensitivity to 
excavation by boring has also been demonstrated, 
as well as the ability to distinguish simultaneous 
blasting at an undeclared location from declared 
excavation. The obvious advantages of microseismic 
monitoring in detecting clandestine tunnelling 
are that, firstly, it covers the entire volume of host 
rock between and beyond the network of drillholes 
and other monitoring locations, and secondly, that 
blasts are detected immediately. On the other hand, 
because of the large sampling frequency of seismic 
sensors, the measurement data cannot be stored as 
a continuous time series, but the measuring sta-
tions are programmed to store and transmit only 
the sequences of data where a seismic event occurs 
according to certain triggering criteria.
One of the methods of thermal monitoring is 
measuring the temperature of drillhole water when 
the PFL flow logging equipment is lowered into a 
drillhole before the flow measurement. Figure 5 
presents temperature profiles measured in drill-
hole OL-KR7 at the beginning of six flow logging 
measurements (Johansson et al. 2017). With its two 
Figure 4. Microseismic events detected in the ONKALO block in 2010. Colour scale indicates time from January 
(blue) to December (red). ONKALO access ramp and shafts are shown in orange (Lahti & Siren 2011).
STUK-TR 28
19
temperature peaks around depths of 320 m and 400 
m, the latest data from 2015 differs notably from 
the regular temperature gradients observed in all 
previous measurements. The increase of tempera-
ture results from the vicinity of the ONKALO access 
ramp, which passes the drillhole at distances of 
about 20 m at the depth of the upper temperature 
anomaly and about 35 m at the depth of the lower 
one (see Figure 6). Excavation reached the upper 
point in March 2009 and the lower point in May 
2010, so that the observed temperature effect has 
taken 5–6 years to develop. The 2015 data also 
indicates a decrease of temperature at depth range 
200–260 m where the drillhole intersects a major 
sub-horizontal hydrogeological system named HZ20 
(see Section 3.2). This result demonstrates that it is, 
at least in principle, possible to detect clandestine 
tunnelling by means of thermal monitoring. How-
ever, the method is very slow and uncertain for the 
following reasons: the tunnel has to pass a drillhole 
relatively closely, it takes a long time before the 
existence of the tunnel alters the temperature of 
the surrounding rock mass sufficiently for detection 
(depends on distance but typically order of years), 
and temperature profile measurements are not 
carried out systematically in all drillholes but only 
in those that are selected, by other criteria from 
the drillholes without a packer system installed, for 
groundwater flow logging.
Figure 5. Temperature profiles of drillhole OL-KR7 from 
flow logging during 2003–2015 (Johansson et al. 2017). 
The closest points to the ONKALO access tunnel are 
marked in black and the depth range of the intersec-
tion with hydrogeological zone HZ20 in blue.
Figure 6. The relative positions of drillhole OL-KR7 and the ONKALO (Johansson et al. 2017). View from the north.
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3.2 Hydrology and hydrogeology
The data on the geology and hydrogeology of 
Olkiluoto, gathered by various methods including 
monitoring measurements, has been used to com-
pile a hydrogeological structure model of the site 
(Vaittinen et al. 2017). It describes the hydraulic 
properties of the bedrock with approximately planar 
hydrogeological zones, along which groundwater is 
able to flow significantly more easily than in the 
rock volumes in between. The zones coincide with 
bedrock faults and fractures that have formed dur-
ing the geological evolution of Olkiluoto. Monitor-
ing of hydraulic head mostly concentrates on the 
modelled zones, and increasingly on transmissive 
fractures at the disposal depth, because they are 
essential for both the planning and the long-term 
safety analysis of the repository. Figure 7 presents 
a 3D visualisation of the current hydrogeological 
structure model showing almost the whole Olkiluoto 
area, and Figure 8 a close-up around the ONKALO, 
where the model is more detailed than elsewhere 
because of denser observations.
Figures 9, 11 and 12 present hydraulic head data 
from three example cases in which the construction 
of the ONKALO has caused clear effects in the 
monitoring results. In the first case in April 2006, 
the excavation of the access ramp was just reaching 
the intersection with the HZ19 zone (cyan ellipse 
in Figure 8 and red circle in Figure 10). As usual, 
probe holes were drilled from the end of the tunnel 
towards the direction of excavation to examine the 
rock ahead. One of the probe holes penetrated the 
conductive fractures belonging to the HZ19 zone, 
triggering groundwater inflow and a decrease in 
groundwater pressure. As Figure 9 shows, the 
leak lasted for about 18 hours and made the head 
(groundwater pressure expressed as the height of 
the water column in an open drillhole) fall by five 
metres in the nearest monitored drillhole section in 
HZ19, L3 of drillhole OL-KR23 (about 300 m to the 
east from the leaking probe hole), and three metres 
in section L7 of OL-KR29 (about 400 m to the south-
west). In monitoring sections further away from the 
leak, the effect was smaller and smoother, but still 
observable as far as in section L5 of OL-KR9 (750 
m to the east). Figure 10 presents a 3D visualisa-
tion of the ONKALO (shown in the 2017 extent for 
reference), zone HZ19C (the widest part of the HZ19 
system according to the hydrogeological model), 
and the affected drillholes and monitoring sections 
mentioned above and referred to in the preceding 
data plot.
The second example of a response of hydraulic 
head to the construction of the ONKALO is from 
Figure 7. Visualisation of the hydrogeological structure model of Olkiluoto. Coloured polygons rep-
resent hydrogeolgical zones (HZ+number) or brittle deformation zones (BFZ+number), the thick grey 
line the shoreline of Olkiluoto, and thin black lines deep drillholes. View from the south-west.
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Figure 8. Visualisation of the hydrogeological structure model in the surroundings of the ONKALO. 
The dark grey line represents the ONKALO access ramp and shafts. The cyan and orange ellipses 
show where the ONKALO intersection with the HZ19 and HZ20 systems, respectively, caused re-
markable effects in the hydraulic head.
Figure 9. Change of head in some monitored drillhole sections during a leak from a probe hole intersecting 
the HZ19 system. The vertical green and red lines mark the beginning and end of the leak, respectively. Drill-
hole section labels consist of drillhole code (KR+number), section code (L+number), and range of drillhole 
length in metres.
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July 2008. At that time, the access ramp was ap-
proaching the intersection with zone HZ20 (orange 
ellipse in Figure 8). Before excavating through 
the zone, a core-drilled pilot hole, longer than the 
routine probe holes, was made into the planned 
tunnel profile for investigations. The pilot hole 
penetrated the HZ20 zone, and a leak that lasted for 
over two weeks started. The largest head response 
in the head monitoring data occurred in section L4 
of drillhole OL-KR4, which lies only a few dozen 
metres from the leaking point. The interruption in 
the data from that section, as well as the almost as 
strongly affected L2 of OL-KR22, results from the 
water level in the measuring hoses in the drillholes 
falling below the pressure sensor. Uninterrupted 
data exists from section L2 of OL-KR25 (230 m 
from the leaking point), where the head decreased 
by about 8.5 m before the leak stopped. In other 
monitored drillhole sections in the HZ20 zone, the 
response decreases with distance still being about 1 
m in section L8 of OL-KR5, which lies about 900 m 
to the north-west of the leak point, and 1.6 m in L1 
of OL-KR44, 1,000 m to the east.
The third example is also related to zone HZ20. 
In July 2009, as a preparation for the raise boring of 
one of the vertical shafts in the ONKALO, grouting 
holes were drilled at the level of zone HZ20. During 
a leak from one of the holes, head decreased by al-
most 20 m in about 12 hours in drillhole sections L3 
of OL-KR4, L2 of OL-KR25, and L1 of OL-KR22. The 
response was much smaller or zero in other sections 
of the same drillholes, demonstrating how hydraulic 
effects propagate significantly better along the 
hydrogeological zones than in other directions.
Figure 13 presents a 3D visualisation of the 
ONKALO (shown in the 2017 extent for reference), 
zones HZ20A and HZ20B (nearly parallel parts of 
the HZ20 system according to the hydrogeological 
model), and the affected drillholes and monitoring 
sections mentioned above and referred to in the 
data plots.
During the excavation of the ONKALO, dozens of 
responses to temporary groundwater leaks, similar 
to the three examples presented here, have occurred 
in the monitoring data. Most of them have been 
mediated by zones HZ19 and HZ20. Moreover, in a 
Figure 10. 3D visualisation of the ONKALO, hydrogeological zone HZ19C, and some head monitoring sections of 
drillholes where a response to the probe hole leak in April 2006 was detected. The leak occurred when the exca-
vation of the ONKALO was proceeding to the area marked with the red circle. The drillholes are presented with 
black lines and the selected monitoring sections with thick blue lines. View from the south-west.
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number of monitored drillhole sections, a long-term 
drawdown (decrease of head) has developed due 
to hydraulic connections to the ONKALO. On the 
basis of this experience, hydraulic head monitoring 
data is sensitive to tunnelling in the repository 
site. When excavation or drilling intersects a major 
hydrogeological zone or a local hydraulically con-
ductive feature, groundwater pressure is inevitably 
affected, and the effect propagates to distances of a 
few hundred meters in a matter of hours. Advan-
Figure 11. Change of head in some monitored drillhole sections during a leak from a pilot hole inter-
secting the HZ20 structure. The vertical green and red lines mark the beginning and end of the leak, 
respectively. Drillhole section labels consist of drillhole code (KR+number), section code (L+number), 
and range of drillhole length in metres.
Figure 12. Change of head in some monitored drillhole sections during a leak from a shaft grouting hole 
intersecting the HZ20 structure. The vertical green and red lines mark the beginning and end of the leak, 
respectively. Drillhole section labels consist of drillhole code (KR+number), section code (L+number), and 
range of drillhole length in metres.
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tages in comparison with microseismic monitoring 
are that continuous monitoring data is automati-
cally stored from all operational sensors and that 
the effect of excavation is not instantaneous but 
usually lasts for at least a couple of days even if the 
leak itself is quickly stopped. Therefore, missing a 
signal because of failed triggering of the measure-
ment system is not possible. On the other hand, 
there are the evident limitations that, firstly, a 
response can usually only be observed if the tunnel 
or drillhole penetrates a hydrogeological zone that 
has intersections in monitored drillhole sections, 
and secondly, the exact location of the leak causing 
the head decrease cannot be determined from the 
data because of the heterogeneity of the structures 
mediating the effect. A rough estimate of the loca-
tion can, however, be deduced if the same effect is 
observed in more than one monitoring sections.
Water table monitoring has in some cases 
detected effects of surface activity involving sub-
stantial excavation of the overburden or continuous 
pumping of groundwater. Examples include digging 
research trenches for studies of the bedrock surface 
and laying the foundations of new buildings. How-
ever, these effects have only been observable with 
a delay and at a short distance from the source, so 
that the cause has obviously been known to any 
field personnel before the monitoring measure-
ments.
3.3 Hydrogeochemistry
Hydrogeochemical monitoring in general cannot 
be thought to produce data relevant for the imple-
mentation of nuclear safeguards, unless radiological 
monitoring is included in the programme in the 
future. However, monitoring of the water flow-
ing in the ditch in the ONKALO access ramp is 
sensitive to excavation in the ONKALO because of 
the water used in drilling. As an example of this, 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 present flow and electric 
conductivity data from automatic measuring weir 
ONK-MPL3125 on 6 and 7 February 2017. On both 
days, a flow peak occurred because of the drilling 
of grouting holes in the ONKALO at a distance 
Figure 13. 3D illustration of the ONKALO, hydrogeological zones HZ20A (purple) and HZ20B 
(blue), and some head monitoring sections of drillholes where responses to the leaks dis-
cussed in the text were detected. The drillholes are presented with black lines and the selected 
monitoring sections with thick blue lines. View from the south.
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upwards from the weir. Since the process water used 
in the drilling is more diluted than the groundwater 
leaking into the tunnel from the bedrock, there also 
occurred coinciding dips in electrical conductivity. 
Careless excavation of undeclared rooms connected 
to the ONKALO could, hypothetically, also produce 
this kind of results.
3.4 Surface environment
The monitoring of land use within the programme 
for the surface environment is based on aerial pho-
tography, registering construction projects and other 
activities at Olkiluoto that affect the use of land, and 
on maintaining an interpreted 50 m × 50  m land 
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Figure 14. Flow of water in a measuring weir in the ONKALO during Feb. 6–7, 2017.
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Figure 15. Electric conductivity of water in a measuring weir in the ONKALO during Feb. 6–7, 2017.
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use grid. Figure 16 presents an aerial photograph 
taken for this purpose in 2015, and Figure 17 the 
latest published version of the land use grid for 2013 
(Pere et al. 2015). As a part of the implementation of 
safeguards, the aerial photograph could be used to 
detect buildings on the surface, tunnel openings and 
the piling of excavated rock and soil.
3.5 Monitoring of radioactivity
Although not a part of the present monitoring pro-
gramme, monitoring of radioactivity in the reposi-
tory, encapsulation plant, and their environment 
will start together with the final disposal.
Figure 17. Land use grid for 2013 (Pere et al. 2015).
Figure 16. Aerial photograph of Olkiluoto, taken in 2015 for land use monitoring.
STUK-TR 28
27
4 Resources needed for 
using monitoring for 
implementing safeguards
According to the above analysis, three monitoring 
methods yield data that is reasonable to use for 
safeguards implementation: microseismic monitor-
ing, automatic hydraulic head monitoring in deep 
packed-off drillholes, and the monitoring of land use.
4.1 Microseismic monitoring
The results of microseismic monitoring have al-
ready been submitted according to Posiva’s safe-
guards programme, and taken into account in 
the safeguards implementation. The contractor 
responsible for the microseismic measurements 
presents the detected seismic events in a monthly 
report, which is saved in Posiva’s electronic archive 
and made available to STUK. The results are also 
summarised in the annual monitoring report of the 
discipline of rock mechanics. The examination of 
these documents can be continued with the current 
resources.
4.2 Hydraulic head monitoring
Hydraulic head in the deep drillholes in Olkiluoto 
appears to be the most obvious subject with which 
the monitoring-based implementation of safeguards 
could be widened. Posiva reports the results of head 
monitoring in the form of quarterly memos that 
present the data from each three-month period, 
preliminary analysis on the causes of observed 
changes, changes in the monitoring system, known 
technical issues, etc. The results are also presented 
and further discussed in the annual reports of hy-
drological and hydrogeological monitoring together 
with other data of the discipline. Currently, these 
documents are communicated to STUK in relation 
to its role as the supervisor of the construction and 
long-term safety of the disposal facility, but not 
directly for safeguards purposes.
The use of the hydraulic head monitoring data 
in the implementation of safeguards would not 
necessarily require new reporting from Posiva, but 
the examination of the already regularly submitted 
material for safeguards-relevant matters would pro-
vide STUK with the essential information. Special 
attention should be paid to changes of hydraulic 
head in hydrogeological zones HZ19 and HZ20, 
which cover a large area above the projected re-
pository, are both intersected by several monitored 
drillhole sections, and have proven to be rather 
sensitive to any drilling or excavation through the 
zone. The required work would consist of examining 
the quarterly memos on head monitoring as soon 
as they become available, the applicable sections of 
the annual monitoring report, and, possibly, other 
treatments of hydraulic head observations. The 
estimated work load in a year would be of the order 
of a week.
Even though STUK’s approach to implementing 
nuclear safeguards is to rely on data and report-
ing provided by the operator of the facility under 
supervision, it may also be useful to comment here 
on the possibility of using independent monitoring 
equipment to ensure the authenticity of the data. 
In the case of monitoring hydraulic head in the 
bedrock, this would mean either drilling one or more 
new drillholes for the purpose, installing separate 
pressure sensors and data acquisition equipment in 
selected packer sections of existing drillholes, or re-
serving one or more of the existing drillholes exclu-
sively for independent monitoring. However, none 
of these options can be considered realistic for the 
following reasons. First, drilling new holes through 
the major hydrogeological zones would increase the 
risk of mixing chemically different groundwater 
types naturally occurring at different depths, and 
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other disturbances regarded as disadvantageous for 
the long-term safety of the final disposal. Moreover, 
it would reduce the volume of intact rock without 
artificial vertical hydraulic connections available 
for the excavation of disposal tunnels. Second, 
drillhole dimensions have been designed so that the 
sensors and measurement hoses for the currently 
monitored sections barely fit in, leaving no room for 
extra sensors. The sensors must be installed inside 
the holes at depths of tens of metres because they 
have to be located below the water level. Third, it 
would unnecessarily hamper other studies, such as 
chemical sampling, flow logging and geophysical 
investigations in the drillholes, if Posiva lost control 
of some of them.
4.3 Land use monitoring
Posiva regularly orders aerial photographs of 
Olkiluoto (every other year according to the present 
programme), and maintains a land use record and 
a land use grid on the basis of the photographs 
as well as information gathered on the site and 
other available sources. The results of Posiva’s 
land use monitoring could be used by STUK in the 
implementation of nuclear safeguards, for example 
by checking that they are consistent with the site 
declaration. Because both the aerial photography 
and the update of the land use grid are carried out 
only once every two years, the required resource in 
terms of working time would only amount to at most 
a few days per year.
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5 Conclusions
This report discusses the Olkiluoto Monitoring Pro-
gramme and its potential in implementing nuclear 
safeguards on the disposal facility for spent nuclear 
fuel that Posiva Oy is constructing. A systematic 
assessment of the relevance of each monitoring 
method for safeguards leads to the conclusion that 
three of them produce usable results: microseismic 
monitoring, automatic hydraulic head monitoring 
in deep drillholes, and land use monitoring. In 
addition, some methods can, in principle, indicate 
surface excavation or tunnelling, but only at a 
short distance (if at all) and after the activity would 
already have been detected visually. Therefore, it 
is not reasonable to use them for implementing 
safeguards.
The results of microseismic monitoring, i.e., the 
detected and located seismic events in Olkiluoto 
and the surrounding region, have been reported to 
STUK for safeguards supervision since the early 
stages of the excavation of ONKALO, an under-
ground rock characterisation facility now becoming 
the central part and access route to the disposal 
facility. This method of monitoring has proven to ac-
curately detect blasts from underground excavation 
as well as on the surface.
Automatic hydraulic head (groundwater pres-
sure) monitoring acquires hourly data on ground-
water pressure in over 200 packer sections of deep 
drillholes in Olkiluoto. A significant share of the 
monitored packer sections have been positioned in 
sub-horizontal hydrogeological zones, where pres-
sure variations, caused by groundwater leaking 
from the zone into drilled holes or excavated spaces, 
have been observed to spread over long distances. 
Therefore, hydraulic head monitoring, especially in 
the HZ20 system of the hydrogeological model of 
Olkiluoto, has potential to reveal clandestine tun-
nelling or drilling from the ground surface towards 
the depth of the disposal facility. Its advantages 
include sensitivity to all methods of excavation, in 
contrast to microseismic monitoring that can reli-
ably only detect blasting. Another advantage is that 
the effects on head that can reveal underground 
activity are long-lasting or even irreversible, so the 
probability of missing a significant signal is low. The 
most obvious disadvantages are that the source of 
the signal cannot be located with the same accuracy 
as in microseismic monitoring, and the method is 
sensitive only to activities within the hydraulically 
conductive zones. Posiva already reports the results 
of hydraulic head monitoring with interpreted 
explanations to detected variations regularly for the 
supervision of the construction and long-term safety 
of the disposal facility.
The monitoring of land use in Olkiluoto involves 
aerial photography and updating a land use grid 
every second year. These results, if reported to 
STUK for safeguards purposes, can be used to 
supplement other aerial or satellite imagery of 
the Olkiluoto site in verifying the declared surface 
constructions and activities.
The required resources for widening the use 
of monitoring data in the implementation of safe-
guards consist of working time needed for the 
examination of reported results. For the hydraulic 
head results, the estimated work load is of the order 
of one week per year, and for the results of land use 
monitoring, a few days per year.
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